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Abstract

Introduction
Deep leakage from gradient (DLG) is an Inference attack on
gradient-sharing federated learning model. The algorithm
eavesdrops a gradient update from federated learning models.
The DLG generates a random image. Then, it optimizes the
image to minimize the distance between a gradient of created
data and the eavesdropped gradient. The resulting image
becomes identical to the original image
Currently, the available defense mechanism is applying differential
privacy. According to the authors of the DLG, Gaussian noise with
a variance of 10!$ is necessary. The noise significantly reduces
the performance of the model
We propose a defensive neural network that defenses inference
attacks. The proposed scheme distorts the original data to
imperceptible data to human eyes. We employed two optimization
criteria to distort the image and increase performance

The proposed scheme needs to achieve both protection of privacy and high performance. The result of
simulations shows that the proposed scheme successfully achieved model performance and the protection of
data privacy.

Accuracy
Fig. 1 shows the accuracy of each federated learning model on the CIFAR-10 dataset. Dataset is divided
identically into five sub-datasets with no overlapping. Each experiment includes one server and five clients.
The plain scheme is a baseline, unprotected model. Gaussian noise denotes a federated learning model with
differential privacy. The proposed scheme is our proposed scheme. Alpha and beta are hyperparameters that
control training of defensive layers and local models.

Classification accuracy

Federated Learning (FL) is a promising technique for edge
computing environments since it provides more secure privacy
protections. However, recent research has shown that FL is
vulnerable to an inference attack, which is an adversarial
algorithm that is capable of identifying the data used to compute
the gradient. We proposed the defensive neural network to
defend the inference attack on FL. The simulation result shows
that the proposed scheme has 9.31% higher classification
accuracy and 19.25% lower attack accuracy on average than
the differential private schemes.

Conclusions
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The result shows that there is no significant difference in classification accuracy for the plain scheme and
proposed scheme. This shows that our proposed scheme did not experience significant performance
degradation. On the other hand, differential privacy models with a variance of 1e-4, 1e-3, and 1e-2 showed
the extreme degradation in classification performance. Also, the authors of the DLG attack mentioned required
variance to thwart the attack is 1e-2, which achieved a significant degradation in classification accuracy.

Research Question(s)
Differential privacy sacrifices model performance to protect data
privacy. Can we adjust neural network architecture and
optimization goals to achieve privacy protection and model
performance?

Materials and Methods
Privacy protection

Fig. 3

Our proposed scheme successfully failed the inference attack by distorting the input image. Fig. 2 shows how
the image is being distorted to various hyper-parameter settings. The figure shows that each image is
successfully distorted, which is totally not discernible. Some of the images are not purely imperceptible. The
shape of the airplane in distorted images of airplanes are still visible. Nevertheless, crucial visual features,
such as color and details of the airplane are distorted. Thus the privacy of the data is protected.
We implemented our proposed scheme in python. Each device in
federated learning receives an identical neural network structure.
The proposed scheme includes defensive layers and a local
model. The local model is identical to the original federated
learning model. The goal of the defensive layer is to distort the
input image. The goal of the local model is to maximize
classification accuracy. Thus, the local model optimizes itself to
distorted data. In each communication round, the local model
receives new weights from the central server. With new weights,
each device optimizes both local model and defensive layers.

In this project, we proposed a novel defense neural network
for federated learning to prevent inference attacks. The
proposed scheme resolved a trade-off of differential privacy by
achieved simultaneously higher classification accuracy and
lower attack accuracy than the differential privacy scheme. In
future work, we plan to mathematically analyze the
convergence bound of the proposed scheme. Also, we also
plan to enhance the proposed scheme to mitigate local server
as adversary

Fig 3. shows the simulation of the DLG attack on various federated learning models. For a plain scheme,
which is unprotected, the attack algorithm starts from a random image and eventually recovers the ground
truth. For differential privacy schemes, schemes with variances of 10!" and 10!# failed to defend the attack
algorithm. Scheme with variance 10!$ defends the attack, however, colors of the ground truth is revealed. For
the proposed scheme, it is clear that the attack algorithm failed to recover the image. It generated an image
that was already distorted. Thus the resulting image from the attack does not include any visual feature of the
ground truth. Thus, our proposed scheme successfully achieved both privacy protection and undamaged
performance.
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